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THE NATIONAL IMPERATIVE FOR HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION: WHY CERTAIN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ARE
APPROPRIATE DESPITE SECTION 7 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
NATHAN D. SARGENT
ABSTRACT
Integration among health care providers offers a promising solution to the health
care crisis. Unfortunately, some efforts to improve the American health care system
through integration have been halted by antitrust concerns and the enforcement of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Health care costs could be contained and clinical
quality improved by allowing a narrow statutory exemption to enforcement of
section 7 for health care integrations that demonstrate cost efficiency and advance
patient care. Under such limited circumstances, relaxed antitrust regulation is an
appropriate response to health care’s current financial crisis that will ultimately
benefit America’s consumers and economy by transforming the fragmented volumebased health care system to one based on value.
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INTRODUCTION
The American health care system is rapidly transforming.1 Disruptive forces,
such as the evolution of the physician-patient relationship,2 payment reform,3 and the
continued implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Affordable Care Act”),4 have only increased the level of complexity in an already
multifarious industry. Coupled with long-term financial challenges,5 health care’s
1 See, e.g., Ellen Lee, 5 Ways Technology is Transforming Health Care, FORBES (Jan. 24,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bmoharrisbank/2013/01/24/5-ways-technology-istransforming-health-care (showing five key technological advancements in health care); Susan
DeVore, The Changing Health Care World: Trends to Watch in 2014, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/10/the-changing-health-care-worldtrends-to-watch-in-2014/ (noting key trends to monitor throughout 2014); Ellis M. Knight,
Transforming Healthcare Delivery Through Value-Based Care Design, BECKER’S HOSP. REV.
(Oct.
17,
2013),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-managementadministration/transforming-healthcare-delivery-through-value-based-care-design.html
(highlighting the importance of value-based care redesign).
2 See Michael Weiner & Paul Biondich, The Influence of Information Technology on
Patient-Physician Relationships, 21 (Supp. 1) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., S35, S36-37 (2006),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1484834/pdf/jgi_307.pdf (examining the
evolution of the physician-patient relationship as a result of technology).
3 See,
e.g., Payment Reform and New Models of Care, RAND CORP.,
http://www.rand.org/health/key-topics/aca/payment-reform.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2015)
(reviewing various alternative methods of payment); Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform
AFFS.
BLOG
(Feb.
6,
2014),
Landscape:
Overview,
HEALTH
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/06/the-payment-reform-landscape-overview
(summarizing the payment reform landscape across the American health care industry).
4

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.

5

An understanding of the financial aspects of health care is critical, as it relates to almost
any policy discussion focused on reform or improvement. A fundamental overview is
provided infra Part I.A.2.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss1/7

2

2015] THE IMPERATIVE FOR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

85

evolving state has forced more and more health care providers6 to seek out various
types of affiliations with other organizations to mitigate the effects of these industrywide shifts. Examples exist almost everywhere in the United States, from western
Pennsylvania to northern California.7 Antitrust implications are inevitable given the
increased level of system integration.
Though opinions vary, health care provider integration has the potential to
deliver real benefits to patients and communities across the United States.8 Despite
those benefits, strict enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act9 can prevent such
6 Information related to the definition and classification of health care providers is
presented infra Part I.A.1.
7

See e.g., Phil Galewitz, Is Bigger Better? Idaho Hospital Battle a Microcosm of Debate
(Apr.
22,
2014),
over
Industry
Consolidation,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/idaho-hospital-health-care-consolidation-hospitals
(summarizing various instances of hospital and health system consolidation, including
examples in Idaho, Pittsburgh, and northern California); Anna Wilde Mathews & John W.
Miller, Health-Care Rivals Battle for Patients in Pittsburgh, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577295901619123904
(exploring health care market dynamics in western Pennsylvania); Dan Verel, Prime
Healthcare Sues SEIU-UHW Amid Acquisition Talks with Daughters of Charity, MEDCITY
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://medcitynews.com/2014/09/prime-healthcare-sues-seiu-uhwamid-acquisition-talks-daughters-charity (summarizing a proposed transaction between
California health care providers and a union’s efforts to prevent it); Managing and Evaluating
Rapid-Cycle Process Improvements as Vehicles for Hospital System Redesign, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2007), http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/finalreports/rapidcycle/rapidcycle1.html (providing examples of innovation and change at one
health system as a microcosm of the entire health care industry).
8

See infra Part II.

9

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). The statute’s text reads as follows:

No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons
engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the
voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.
....
Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right
heretofore legally acquired:
Provided,
That nothing in this section shall be held or construed to authorize or make lawful
anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by the antitrust laws, nor to exempt any
person from the penal provisions thereof or the civil remedies therein provided.
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mergers and acquisitions if the Federal Trade Commission predicts anticompetitive
effects.10 In an effort to balance antitrust enforcement and the high-level priorities
associated with health care reform, strict enforcement of section 7 should be
reevaluated when health care transactions fall under scrutiny. The FTC’s antitrust
enforcement should be adjusted to support government and industry efforts to
contain rising health care costs11 and improve clinical quality.12 Congress can
accomplish this by passing legislation that allows for a narrow statutory exemption
to enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act for health care transactions that (1)
demonstrate likely cost savings or efficiencies, (2) are focused on enhancing quality
or patient outcomes, and (3) are aimed at enhancing or maintaining existing health
care service offerings. Such a statutory exemption would permit transactions similar
to the example13 discussed later in this Note but would avoid substantial degradation
of antitrust regulatory authority and its associated consumer protections.
This Note is set forth in four parts. Part I.A begins with background information
related to the health care industry, including key concepts and terms, industry trends,
and an overview of the health care provider response to health care reform. Part I.B
provides a summary of antitrust law and enforcement, including applicable statutes
that create FTC jurisdiction and how the FTC conducts antitrust analysis. Part I.C is
an in-depth review of a recent health care transaction in Idaho, in which the FTC
won the dissolution of the transaction in federal court. This case exemplifies how
health care providers are attempting to integrate and how the FTC’s authority can
curtail such ventures.
Part II.A begins with the financial rationale in support of a statutory exemption to
section 7 enforcement and cites the current and past performance of the health care
industry, the industry’s capital needs, and the difficult transition from volume-tovalue-based compensation as support. Part II.B continues with quality-based
rationale, including the existing fragmentation of the current health care system and
emphasizing effective and efficient health care as a critical consumer protection. Part
II.C presents additional support regarding the maintenance of existing health care
services and the value of integrated health care delivery as it relates to governmentsponsored innovation projects. Finally, Part II.D, sets forth a new standard for FTC
evaluation should the proposed statutory exemption be adopted. The Note concludes
with a brief summation and conclusion.
Id.
10 The FTC’s ability to investigate and potentially prevent transactions from occurring
based on predicted anticompetitive effects is a critical component of the agency’s regulatory
authority. See infra Part I.B.
11

Key trend information is presented infra Part I.A.2.

12

Improved clinical quality remains a constant focus among health care providers as well
as government entities. See, e.g., About the National Quality Strategy (NQS), AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/workingforquality/about.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2015); Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, In Focus: Improving Patient Flow – In and
Out of Hospitals and Beyond, COMMONWEALTH FUND: QUALITY MATTERS (Oct./Nov. 2013),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/quality-matters/2013/octobernovember/in-focus-improving-patient-flow; see also infra Part II.B.
13 For an example of the FTC’s scrutiny involving the acquisition of Saltzer Medical
Group by St. Luke’s Health System, see infra Part I.C.
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I. THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT
A. The Health Care Industry
1. Essential Concepts and Terminology
Before examining current and emerging health care trends, it is necessary to
develop a fundamental understanding of core industry-specific concepts and
terminology. An appropriate starting point is the definition of a health care provider.
According to the HIPAA Privacy Rules, “health care provider means a . . . provider
of medical or health services, and any other person or organization who furnishes,
bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business.”14 For the purposes
of this Note, the term “provider” will be used in reference to organizations or
institutions as opposed to individual clinicians.
One provider group that has grown substantially throughout the United States is
the integrated delivery system. An integrated delivery system is often a provider or
group of providers that come together under some legal structure in an effort to
better manage health care delivery.15 Though there is no specific organizational
model, integrated delivery systems often partner or contract with a health plan to
further coordinate the full continuum of care.16 Integrated delivery systems vary in
scope and size, but are widely considered to be a tool capable of controlling health
care costs, increasing efficiency, and improving clinical quality.17 As will be
examined in Part I.C, St. Luke’s Health System is an example of an integrated
delivery system, along with many others across the United States.18
14

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2015) (internal citations omitted).

15

See Wenke Hwang et al., Effects of Integrated Delivery System on Cost and Quality, 19
J.
MANAGED
CARE
e175,
176
(May
10,
2013),
AM.
http://www.ajmc.com/journals/issue/2013/2013-1-vol19-n5/effects-of-integrated-deliverysystem-on-cost-and-quality.
16 Eric R. Wagner & Peter R. Kongstvedt, Types of Managed Care Organizations and
Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED CARE 36 (Peter R.
Kongstvedt, ed., 6th ed. 2013); see also ESSENTIAL HOSPS. INST., INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE
LITERATURE
REV.
1-2
(2013),
http://essentialhospitals.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/Integrated-Health-Care-Literature-Review-Webpost-8-22-13-CB.pdf
(listing definitions for integrated delivery systems). Additional common characteristics
include shared economic and clinical accountability, increased alignment and efficiency, and
coordinated and patient-centered care processes. See id. All of the aforementioned
organizational and clinical qualities imply a somewhat sizable scale within the integrated
delivery system’s geographic market and breadth of available services. The example outlined
infra Part II.C is an example of two providers attempting to integrate for similar purposes and
results.
17

See, e.g., How CHI is Building and Buying Its Own Insurance Plan, ADVISORY BD. CO.
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/03/27/how-chi-is-building-andbuying-its-own-insurance-plan (citing an example of a large, multi-state health system
launching an insurance product in an effort to improve costs).
18

See St. Luke’s Health System, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form
990), http://news.stlukesblogs.org/files/2013/04/SLHS-Form-990-FY-13-PI-Copy.pdf (last
visited Sept. 30, 2015) (indicating the health system’s corporate structure, as filed with the
Internal Revenue Service); see also Leigh Page, 50 Integrated Delivery Systems to Know,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
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In addition to common organizational structures, a basic overview of the
payment system is of equal importance. Generally, a payer is an “entit[y] other than
the patient that finance[s] or reimburse[s] the cost of health services.”19 In most
cases, a payer is an insurance carrier, other third-party payer, or health plan sponsor,
such as an employer or union. Notwithstanding commercial insurers,20 the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) is the single largest insurance payer in
the United States.21 CMS provides insurance coverage for nearly 123 million
Americans.22 That number is estimated to grow following the Affordable Care Act’s
expansion of insurance coverage under Medicare and Medicaid.23 CMS’s importance
in health care cannot be understated. On top of the fact that it covers a substantial
portion of the United States’ insured population,24 it sets an important fee schedule
for health services.25 Formally referred to as the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule,
private insurance payers often base their own payment rates on these CMS
benchmarks.26
The Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and other payer fee schedules have been
the primary drivers of health care’s financial outlook under the fee-for-service
payment model that has been in place for the last several decades.27 Fee-for-service
physician-relationships/50-integrated-delivery-systems-to-know.html
(listing
numerous
integrated delivery systems across the United States and reviewing their corresponding
organizational models).
19

Payer, MOSBY’S DENTAL DICTIONARY 497 (2d ed. 2008).

20

Examples of large private insurers include UnitedHealth Group, Kaiser Foundation
Group, Aetna Group, and many others. See Evi Heilbrunn, Top Health Insurance Companies,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 5, 2014), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/healthinsurance/articles/2013/12/16/top-health-insurance-companies (listing the largest health
insurers in the United States in terms of market share).
21 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS ROADMAPS OVERVIEW 1,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/downloads/RoadmapOverview_OEA_1-16.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 28, 2015).
22 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 2 (2014), http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/AgencyInformation/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2015-CJ-Final.pdf (reviewing CMS’s scope
and financial needs).
23

See id. at 1.

24 See Heath Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
25

See Overview of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Search, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/apps/physician-fee-schedule/overview.aspx (last
visited Sept. 13, 2015).
26 See Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers:
Growth Rates in Spending over Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 230, 231-33 (Mar./Apr.
2003), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/22/2/230.full.pdf.
27 See James C. Capretta, The Role of Medicare Fee-for-Service in Inefficient Health Care
Delivery, AM. ENTER. INST. & ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., 3 (2013),
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/-the-role-of-medicare-feeforservice-ininefficient-health-care-delivery_141413376272.pdf; see also Jeffrey Clemens, How Medicare
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is a fairly straightforward payment methodology. Providers bill and are compensated
by insurance payers for the procedures they conduct based on a predetermined rate.28
Despite its prevalence, fee-for-service is being pushed to the side to make room for
value-based payment models.
Value-based models often compensate providers a predetermined amount for
delivering a desired outcome, regardless of the particularized services needed to do
so.29 As expected, this drastic shift is causing considerable disruption across the
industry and forcing health care providers to take on additional financial risk.30
Despite the challenges involved with its adoption, value-based reimbursement is the
most promising way to drive down health care costs.31 Examples currently being
piloted include capitation,32 accountable care organizations,33 and bundled
payments.34
2. Key Health Care Trends
As outlined previously, the administrative and financial aspects of the American
health care system clearly illustrate the industry’s complexity. Tension between
consistent and emerging trends further complicates matters. The intersection of
Shapes
the
US
Health
Sector,
ECON. IN ACTION
(May
6,
2014),
http://economics.ucsd.edu/economicsinaction/issue-10/headline.php (emphasizing Medicare’s
impact on private payment systems).
28 Fee for Service, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/fee-for-service
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
29

For further discussion of this concept, see infra Parts II.A.2, 3.

30

This concept will be further reviewed infra Part II.A.

31 See HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, VALUE IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT STATE AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 28-29 (2011), https://www.hfma.org/ValueProject/Phase1 (download
“Value in Health Care”).
32 Capitation is a method of reimbursement where the provider, hospital, or health plan is
paid a fixed amount per patient and is expected to provide all necessary covered services at no
additional charge. BARRY D. ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 3 (Am.
Health Lawyers Ass’n ed., 4th ed. 2008). Total or global capitation describes when an
organization receives capitation for all medical services, institutional and professional. Id. at
30.
33 “Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are groups of . . . providers, who come
together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to their . . . patients. The goal of
coordinated care is to ensure that patients . . . get the right care at the right time, while
avoiding unnecessary duplication of services and preventing medical errors. When an ACO
succeeds in both delivering high-quality care and spending health care dollars more wisely, it
will share in the savings it achieves.” Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/ACO (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (emphasis omitted).
34

Bundled payments “assign[ ] a fixed payment to cover a set of services, such as a
surgery or a patient’s diabetes care, over a defined time period. Bundled payments encourage
providers to manage costs, while meeting standards of high-quality care.” Bundled Payment:
The Quest for Simplicity in Pricing and Tying Payment to Quality, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND. (June 2013), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2013/06/bundled-payment--thequest-for-simplicity-in-pricing-and-tying-p.html.
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health care reform, antitrust law, and provider consolidation underscore the
significance of three primary trend categories. First, as with any topic involving
health care, spending and financial trends top the list in order of importance. Second,
care coordination and quality follow accordingly. Third, the category driving much
of the industry’s disruption, is the transition from volume to value.
When it comes to American health care costs, there is widespread agreement that
the industry is not financially sustainable.35 As of October 1, 2015, the U.S. Census
Bureau estimated the national resident population to be roughly 321,862,610.36 The
World Bank estimated that American gross national income per capita was $55,20037
and the United States’ gross domestic product (“GDP”) was $17.42 trillion.38
Looking specifically at health care, per capita spending is estimated at $9,146.39
Further, aggregated health care expenditures account for approximately 17.1% of the
United States’ GDP.40 Experts forecast that number to reach 19.3% by 2023.41
For purposes of comparison, the United States is often ranked at or near the
bottom in terms of health care costs and efficiency among industrialized nations. For
example, per capita health care spending in Canada ($5,718), France ($4,864),
Germany ($5,006), and the United Kingdom ($3,598) is, on average, close to fifty

35 See generally SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., THE UNSUSTAINABLE COST OF HEALTH CARE
(2009), http://ssab.gov/portals/0/documents/TheUnsustainableCostofHealthCare_graphics.pdf;
Loren Adler & G. William Hoagland, What is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending? America’s
Unsustainable Health Care Cost Growth, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/what-driving-us-health-care-spendingamerica%E2%80%99s-unsustainable-health-care-cost-growth; Rising Health Care Costs Are
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
Unsustainable,
CTRS.
http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/businesscase/reasons/rising.html (last updated
Oct. 23, 2013).
36 Monthly Population Estimates for the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited
Oct.
1,
2015),
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
37 GNI
Per
Capita,
Atlas
Method,
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).

BANK,

38 United States, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
39

Health
Expenditure
Per
Capita,
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP/countries (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).“Total
health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio of total
population. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family
planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not
include provision of water and sanitation.” Id.
40

Health
Expenditure,
Total
(%
of
GDP),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS/countries (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
41 Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2013-23: Faster
Growth Expected with Expanded Coverage and Improving Economy, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1841
(Sept. 2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2014/08/27/hlthaff.2014.0560.
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percent lower.42 Aggregated health care expenditures as a percent of GDP are
similarly low for the same countries.43
From a budgetary perspective, the United States’ deficit has decreased over the
last few years; however, if current tax laws and federal spending remain the same,
that trend will reverse as a result of revenue growing at a slower rate than
spending.44 Though progress has been made related to the federal deficit, President
Barack Obama’s proposed budget for 2014 contained a $744 billion shortfall.45
Within that budget, federal funds allocated for Social Security, Medicare, and health
spending were $866 billion, $531 billion, and $443 billion, respectively.46 Aside
from the raw numbers, total health care expenditures have steadily increased over the
last several decades.47 In most cases, the annual percentage growth of health care
expenditures has outpaced growth of the national economy.48
Despite such drastic spending rates, the United States is consistently mediocre
compared with many of its industrialized peers in terms of health outcomes.49 The
United States has lower adult life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates, and
higher rates of obesity than a host of European countries.50 Several factors contribute

42

See Health Expenditure Per Capita, supra note 39.

43 Aggregated health care expenditures as a percent of GDP: Canada (10.9%), France
(11.7%), Germany (11.3%), and United Kingdom (9.4%). See id.
44

See CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014
2024, 2, 16 (2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/reports/45653-OutlookUpdate_2014_Aug.pdf (summarizing updates to the federal
budget and deficit forecasts).

TO

45

Breaking Down the 2014 Budget, WASH. POST (Apr. 10,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/presidential-budget-2014.
46

2013),

Id.

47

See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COST
GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/healthcostreport_final_noembargo_v2.pdf
(reviewing trends in health care, including multiple decades of increased health care spending
prior to the Affordable Care Act’s passage).
48

See Jean P. Drouin et al., Heatlh Care Costs: A Market-Based View, MCKINSEY Q.,
Sept. 2008, at 1, 3.
49

Generally speaking, health outcomes data are used to measure and compare either the
prevalence of certain disease processes or the rate of treatment success across various patient
populations. Common outcome measures include cardiovascular deaths, diabetes, infant
mortality, obesity, and cancer deaths. See, e.g., America’s Health Rankings, UNITED HEALTH
FOUND., http://www.americashealthrankings.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
50 See Tae Kuen Kim & Shannon R. Lane, Government Health Expenditure and Public
Health Outcomes: A Comparative Study Among 17 Countries and Implications for U.S.
Health Care Reform, 3 AM. J. CONTEMP. RES. No. 9, 10-11 (2013); David A. Squires,
Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An International Comparison of
Supply, Utilization, Prices, and Quality, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 2012),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/May/159
5_Squires_explaining_high_hlt_care_spending_intl_brief.pdf.
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to the rising price of American health care – including pharmaceuticals51 and
medical technology52 – but the inverse relationship between spending and the quality
of patient health and outcomes is problematic. Rising costs and lagging quality have
resulted in CMS ratcheting down payment rates in an effort to control spending.53
Private payers have followed suit,54 making financial performance in a fee-forservice setting more difficult for health care providers. This trend continued
following the passage of the Affordable Care Act.55
3. Provider Response to Health Care Reform
At a high level, the Affordable Care Act is aimed at accomplishing three things:
(1) increased individual access to insurance and health care services, (2) improved
quality of care provided to individuals, and (3) accomplishing both at an overall
lower cost.56 In an effort to advance those three aims, the Affordable Care Act
includes various provisions and components to promote the delivery of value-based

51 See Parija Kavilanz, 6 Reasons Health Care Costs Keep Going Up, CNN MONEY (July
12, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/12/news/economy/health-care-costs.
52

Id.; see also Louis Goodman & Timothy Norbeck, Who’s to Blame for Our Rising
(Apr.
3,
2013),
Healthcare
Costs?
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/03/whos-to-blame-for-our-rising-healthcarecosts.
53

Helen Adamopoulos, 100 Things to Know About Medicare Reimbursement, BECKER’S
HOSP. CFO (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/100-things-toknow-about-medicare-reimbursement.html; see also Merrill Matthews, Doctors Face a 24%
Pay Cut in Both Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursements, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2013/12/02/doctors-facing-a-24-pay-cut-inboth-medicare-and-medicaid-reimbursements.
54

See Jeffrey Bendix, Private Payers Re-Examining Reimbursement, MEDICAL ECON.
(Feb.
25,
2013),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medicaleconomics/news/modernmedicine/modern-medicine-feature-articles/private-payers-reexamining-r?page=full.
55

See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
UPDATE: IMPLEMENTING MEDICARE COST SAVINGS, http://www.cms.gov/apps/docs/acaupdate-implementing-medicare-costs-savings.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2015); Medicare
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEFS, HEALTH AFFS. (Nov. 12,
2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=102.
56
See Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/index.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2014)
(summarizing the key features of the Affordable Care Act). This tripartite framework is
commonly referred to as the Triple Aim. The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE
IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/pages/default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015). Donald Berwick, M.D., a physician who went on to lead both the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
under President Barack Obama, initially developed this concept. Profiles in Leadership: Don
FOR
HEALTHCARE
IMPROVEMENT,
Berwick,
INST.
http://www.ihi.org/education/ihiopenschool/resources/pages/profilesinleadershipdonberwick.a
spx (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). The Triple Aim is a recurring theme in health care policy
development, analysis, and reform. Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, supra.
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care.57 From a provider’s prospective, this further emphasizes the move away from a
fee-for-service business model to a value-based compensation business model. This
kind of transition has proven difficult for many health care providers, especially
stand-alone hospitals, 58 smaller health systems, and independent physician
practices.59 To minimize the financial risks associated with the volume-to-value
transition, many providers need to broaden the patient populations they serve, spread
their financial risks as much as possible, and invest in more powerful information
technology.60 The result has been a significant increase in the number of mergers,
acquisitions, and joint ventures among hospitals, health systems, and other types of
health care providers.61
B. Antitrust Law and Enforcement
1. Key Statutes and Purposes
The increase in provider merger and acquisition activity has caught the attention
of federal and state antitrust regulators.62 Before reviewing the standard approach to
antitrust analysis and enforcement, a brief review of the FTC’s authority is
appropriate. The FTC’s jurisdiction derives from multiple federal statutes, including
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and the Clayton Act.
The FTC was created in September of 1914 when President Woodrow Wilson
signed the FTC Act into law.63 The purpose of the legislation was to create an
agency to protect consumers and promote marketplace competition.64 For purposes
of enforcement, the FTC Act provides the FTC with investigative power and the
authority to protect various forms of consumer activities, such as prohibiting unfair
business practices.65 The Clayton Act was ratified less than a month later in October
of 1914.66 Specifically, section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes contracts, mergers,

57

See Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act.
58 See Kenneth L. Davis, Opinion, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve
Medical Care, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kenneth-l-davishospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medical-care-1410823048.
59

See David C. Pate, Hospital-Physician Relations in a Post-Health Care Reform
Environment, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 7, 18-19 (2012).
60

See id. at 14-16.

61

Ayla Ellison, Should Hospitals Merge to Improve Care, Lower Costs? BECKER’S HOSP.
REV. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-andvaluation/should-hospitals-merge-to-improve-care-lower-costs.html.
62

For an example resulting from increased attention, see infra Part I.C.

63

About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
64

Id.

65

See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).

66

About the FTC, supra note 63.
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and acquisitions that decrease competition and enhance the likelihood of
monopoly.67
Essential to understanding the Clayton Act’s enforcement, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that Congress intentionally used the word “may” in section 7
“to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.”68 Lower courts
expanded upon that notion and hold that section 7 requires a prediction of
anticompetitive effects with doubts to be resolved against the transaction.69 Though
the agency and its enacting laws are more than one hundred years old, the FTC has
as much authority as ever. Further, section 7 remains a substantial source of federal
authority to prevent or dissolve mergers and acquisitions considered anticompetitive.
2. Antitrust Analysis and Enforcement
As a subdivision of the larger agency, the Bureau of Competition leads FTC
enforcement of antitrust laws.70 The Bureau of Competition investigates and seeks
legal remedies in both federal court and in front of administrative law judges.71 The
FTC and the Bureau of Competition typically exercise their authority by reviewing
pre-merger and post-merger transactions, by issuing advisory opinions, and by
conducting administrative rulemaking.72 Aside from the procedural aspects of
67

See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).

68

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).

69

See, e.g., FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).

70

About the Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-competition/about-bureau-competition (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
The Department of Justice maintains certain authority to enforce antitrust laws, but FTC
enforcement will remain the primary focus of this Note.
71 Id. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 made possible the appointment of
administrative law judges. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012) (listing the process and authority for
conducting hearings and presiding employees). A significant number of federal and state
administrative agencies employ administrative law judges, including the FTC, the Department
of Health and Human Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Drug
Enforcement Agency. See Agencies Employing Administrative Law Judges, ASS’N OF ADMIN.
LAW JUDGES, http://www.aalj.org/agencies-employing-administrative-law-judges (last visited
Feb. 20, 2015). The U.S. Office of Personnel Management has a non-delegable responsibility
to administer the administrative law judge examination, the method by which various
government agencies make administrative law judge service appointments. Administrative
Law Judges, U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/services-foragencies/administrative-law-judges/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). Administrative law judges
“serve as independent impartial triers of fact in formal proceedings requiring a decision on the
record after the opportunity for a hearing.” Classification & Qualifications, U.S. OFFICE OF
PERS.
MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classificationqualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialty-areas/administrative-lawjudge-positions (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). Though referred to as “impartial triers of fact,” the
objectivity of administrative law judges is sometimes called into question because the
employing agency can initially function as both prosecutor and judge. See, e.g., Ann Wise,
Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An Independent Administrative Hearings
Tribunal, 68 LA. L. REV. 1169, 1198 (2008).
72 See generally Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last
visited Feb. 13, 2015).
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enforcement, the FTC and Department of Justice lay out their principal analytical
techniques in their jointly published Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”).73
The principles in the Guidelines are simply a framework for analysis as opposed
to a defined step-by-step procedure. According to the document itself, the merger
review process is “fact-specific” and guided by the agencies’ collective experience.74
“The Agencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools to the reasonably available and
reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns in a limited period of time.”75
Even though much of the analysis is uniform, the FTC’s approach is based on the
unique facts and circumstances of each individual transaction. Most importantly,
recall that the Supreme Court held that the FTC and the Bureau of Competition are
able to base their analysis on probabilities as opposed to certainties.76 Likewise, any
doubts arising from the analysis are to be resolved against the transaction in
question.77
When reviewing pre-merger competitive effects, the FTC considers enhanced
market power in the form of increased price, reduced output, or other harms to
consumers that typically result from decreased competition.78 The FTC also
considers non-price related adverse market effects of mergers, including reduced
product quality, reduced variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation.79 If the
FTC analysis takes place after a merger, similar to the example presented in the
following section,80 actual as well as potential adverse effects are taken into
account.81 Whether pre- or post-merger, the FTC’s level of regulatory scrutiny
remains the same.
Another key aspect of the Bureau of Competition’s analysis is the definition of
the relevant market.82 The definition of a market is comprised of the following
73

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf
[hereinafter GUIDELINES]. “These Guidelines should be read with the awareness that merger
analysis does not consist of uniform application of a single methodology.” Id. at 1.
In addition to the Guidelines, the FTC and Department of Justice have published policy
statements specific to health care transactions. Interestingly, the most recent publication date
is 1996 and does not include specific guidance for integrated delivery systems despite their
prevalence across the United States. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0000.pdf.
74

GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 1.

75

Id. “The Agencies consider many sources of evidence in their merger analysis. The
most common sources of reasonably available and reliable evidence are the merging parties,
customers, other industry participants, and industry observers.” Id. at 4.
76

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).

77

FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (1989) (Posner, J.).

78

GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 2.

79

Id.

80

See infra Part I.C.

81

Guidelines, supra note 73, at 3.

82

See id. at 7-8.
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elements: (1) the line of commerce, (2) the geographic section of the country, (3) the
market participants, and (4) market concentration.83 These elements “illuminate” the
merger’s competitive effects.84 Looking specifically at the product market, the
Bureau of Competition reviews the merging firms’ primary product, or service, and
defines a relevant group or substitute of products to analyze the competitive effects.85
Just as important, the Bureau of Competition conducts a geographic market review,
which establishes limits related to consumer willingness or ability to travel to find an
alternative product or service or substitute.86 Product and geographic market analyses
are of great importance when it comes to the health care sector because of the limited
availability of certain health care services and the breadth of the involved providers’
service areas.
As a potential mitigating factor, the Bureau of Competition entertains evidence
related to gains in efficiency presented by the merging parties. The Bureau of
Competition weighs potential efficiencies against anticompetitive effects that may
result from mergers because the merged entities often have the ability to achieve
significant improvements in terms of price, quality, service offerings, and product
offerings.87 From time to time, the Bureau of Competition acknowledges that
“efficient” mergers even enhance the competitive landscape by combining
complementary assets.88 However, the agencies only credit likely or resulting
efficiencies if they are improbable in absence of the merger.89 Thus, the efficiencies
must be “merger specific.”90 Further, according to the Guidelines, vague or
speculative efficiency claims are not considered valid unless they can be verified by
reasonable means.91 Still, the FTC views such efficiency claims with considerable
skepticism.92

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 8-12.

86

Id. at 13.

87

Id. at 29-31.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.; see also FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that
efficiencies resulting from mergers “must be efficiencies that cannot be achieved by either
company alone because, if they can, the merger’s asserted benefits can be achieved without
the concomitant loss of a competitor”).
91

GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 30.

92

See id. As presented in the Guidelines, efficiencies are viewed with such skepticism
because
Efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.
Moreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging firms
may not be realized. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate
efficiency claims so that the Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood
and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss1/7

14

2015] THE IMPERATIVE FOR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

97

C. An Example of When Law and Policy Collide
Taking into account the concepts, trends, legal and regulatory authority set forth
in the preceding part, there are multiple examples of antitrust enforcement blocking
or dissolving mergers and acquisitions across the health care industry.93 One
example took place in Idaho, recently. This example clearly illustrates the challenges
present throughout the American health care industry and how those challenges can
be exacerbated by strict enforcement of section 7.
St. Luke’s Health System (“St. Luke’s”) is the only Idaho-based not-for-profit
health system.94 Headquartered in Boise, St. Luke’s is comprised of seven hospitals95
and multiple freestanding health centers.96 St. Luke’s also employs or contracts with
approximately five hundred physicians across various clinical specialties.97 St.
Luke’s service area includes a majority of southern Idaho as well as parts of eastern
Oregon,98 and is by far Idaho’s largest provider of health care services.99
Roughly twenty miles east of Boise, Saltzer Medical Group (“Saltzer”) is based
in the picturesque suburb of Nampa.100 Historically known for high-quality patient
care, Saltzer is Idaho’s largest independent physician practice.101 In addition to its
main clinic and headquarters in Nampa, Saltzer maintains multiple practice locations

(and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and
incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific.
Id.
93 In addition to the forthcoming in-depth case review, another recent example of the
FTC’s exercise of antitrust authority in the health care field involved ProMedica Heath
System in Toledo, Ohio. See ProMedica Health Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.
2014) (denying ProMedica’s petition to review the FTC’s order for ProMedica to divest a
local community hospital in a nearby suburb). Note that this ProMedica case included the use
of an FTC administrative law judge. Id.
94 About
St.
Luke’s
Health
System,
ST.
LUKE’S
http://www.stlukesonline.org/about_us (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).

HEALTH

95 See
List
of
Locations,
ST.
LUKE’S
HEALTH
http://www.stlukesonline.org/about_us/locations.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
96

SYS.,
SYS.,

See id.

97

Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *3 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d,
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
98

Id.

99 See Galewitz, supra note 7 (referring to St. Luke’s as Idaho’s largest not-for-profit
health system).
100

Location & Clinics, SALTZER MED. GRP., http://www.saltzermed.com/locations (last
visited Sept. 2, 2015).
101

St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3.
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in Meridian, Caldwell, and Boise.102 Slightly more than forty physicians work across
Saltzer facilities, and most of them practice primary care medicine.103
For years, and in line with industry trends,104 senior leadership at St. Luke’s and
Saltzer saw the increasing need for more integrated health care delivery at an overall
lower cost.105 Saltzer believed it needed to make multiple modifications to its longstanding administrative practices, including a transition to a value-based
compensation model and an upgrade to its electronic health record (“EHR”)
system.106 Unfortunately, Saltzer did not have the resources necessary to take on that
level of financial risk.107 Nor could Saltzer make its needed level of investment in
technology infrastructure without partnering with a larger organization.108
Following multiple failed attempts to informally collaborate with other health
care providers—including one with an out-of-state parent—Saltzer determined that
an affiliation with a local partner would likely yield positive results.109 In 2008,
Saltzer and St. Luke’s executed a memorandum of understanding to establish an
informal partnership focused on five specified areas of improvement.110 The five
improvement areas were rooted in three overarching concepts: (1) improved access
to high-quality medical care, (2) enhanced coordination of medical services, and (3)
a streamlined care delivery model in two counties.111
Although their collaboration was well intentioned, both parties admitted to
minimal success because the “informal” relationship proved difficult to manage.112
102

Location & Clinics, supra note 100.

103

St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3. In terms of policy and patient care management, the
importance of primary care medicine cannot be understated. Primary care providers are often
considered the keystone for real and lasting health care reform and industry-wide
improvement. See, e.g., Naomi Freundlich, Primary Care: Our First Line of Defense,
FUND
(June
12,
2013),
COMMONWEALTH
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/health-reform-and-you/primary-care-ourfirst-line-of-defense. Collaboration or integration between primary care medicine providers
and other health care providers is essential. See id. “U.S. adults who have a primary care
physician have 33 percent lower health care costs and 19 percent lower odds of dying than
those who see only a specialist. As a nation, we would save $67 billion each year if everybody
used a primary care provider as their usual source of care.” Id.
104

See supra Part I.A.2.

105

St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3.

106

Id. at *3, *18. “EHRs are, at their simplest, digital (computerized) versions of patients’
paper charts. But EHRs, when fully up and running, are so much more than that. EHRs are
real-time, patient-centered records. They make information available instantly, ‘whenever and
wherever it is needed.’” Learn EHR Basics, OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH
INFO. TECH., http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/learn-ehr-basics (last visited
Sept. 2, 2015).
107

St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3.

108

Id. at *3, *18.

109

Id. at *4.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.
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In 2009, Saltzer approached St. Luke’s to explore a closer, more formal affiliation.113
After nearly three years of extensive negotiations, St. Luke’s acquired Saltzer
effective December 31, 2012.114 As part of the transaction, Saltzer, on behalf of its
physicians, entered into a professional services agreement with St. Luke’s that
included an exclusivity provision, an open referral policy,115 and a production-based
compensation model intended to convert to a value-based model.116
Saltzer’s leadership indicated that its primary motivation for approaching St.
Luke’s was “to provide the best possible health care to the community.”117 Saltzer
further emphasized that the transaction would result in St. Luke’s investment of time
and resources in Canyon County and that St. Luke’s accepted the risk needed for
Saltzer to convert to capitation.118 Last, Saltzer’s leadership noted that the affiliation
with St. Luke’s would result in increased patient access to health care services,
especially for the Medicare and Medicaid populations throughout its geographic
service area.119
Despite the emphasis on improvement of patient care, investment in
infrastructure, and enhanced patient access, St. Luke’s acquisition of Saltzer quickly
fell under scrutiny. In early 2013, two of St. Luke’s local competitors filed a joint
complaint in federal court claiming the transaction had anticompetitive effects; a
second complaint was filed soon after, this time by the Idaho Attorney General and
the FTC.120 According to an FTC press release filed the same day as the complaint,
“the combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give it the market power to
demand higher rates for health care services . . . ultimately leading to higher costs for
health care consumers.”121 The FTC’s primary authority for making such an
assertion: section 7 of the Clayton Act.122

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id. at *5. “Buying” physician referrals of patients and services is illegal under the fraud
and anti-kickback statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012) (listing criminal penalties for acts
involving federal health care programs); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2010) (listing the limitations
on certain physician referrals). The inclusion of such clear language in the Saltzer physicians’
professional services agreement supports the argument that the acquisition was intended to
improve quality and patient care—even if it meant certain referrals leaving the St. Luke’s
delivery system.
116

See St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *5.

117

Id.

118

Id.; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 3 and accompanying text.

119

St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *6.

120

Id. at *1.

121

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Idaho Attorney General Challenge St.
Luke's Health System Acquisition of Saltzer Medical Group as Anticompetitive (Mar. 12,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/03/ftc-idaho-attorney-generalchallenge-st-lukes-health-systems.
122

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
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As previously indicated, section 7 makes mergers and acquisitions unlawful that
“may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or tend . . . to create a monopoly.”123
Thus, it is no real surprise that the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho ruled
in favor of the FTC and summarily ordered St. Luke’s to divest itself of Saltzer.124
Notwithstanding the district court’s decision to unwind the transaction, Chief Judge
B. Lynn Winmill included the following in his conclusion:
Health care is at a crisis point. Nationally, quality lags far behind the
inexorable rise in prices. This has created a groundswell of demand for
change. One change universally recommended is to move away from feefor-service reimbursement and toward integrated care and risk-based
reimbursement, where payment is made on the basis of patient outcomes,
not the volume of services. This is a major change and is slowly being
implemented. This period of change might be best described as being in
an experimental stage, where hospitals and other providers are examining
different organizational models, trying to find the best fit. To be part of
this experimental wave moving toward integrated care, St. Luke’s and
Saltzer agreed on the Acquisition. The Acquisition is an attempt by St.
Luke’s and Saltzer to improve the quality of medical care. . . . In a world
that was not governed by the Clayton Act, the best result might be to
approve the Acquisition and monitor its outcome to see if the predicted
price increases actually occurred. In other words, the Acquisition could
serve as a controlled experiment. But the Clayton Act is in full force, and
it must be enforced. The Act does not give the Court discretion to set it
aside to conduct a health care experiment.125
St. Luke’s appealed the district court’s decision, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.126 On the first page of its opinion, the
Ninth Circuit echoed the district court’s reasoning that it is not the job of the courts
to shape the desired or optimal future of the national health care system.127 A court’s
role is simply to determine whether the merger in question violates the Clayton
Act.128 It remains to be seen whether St. Luke’s will petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for a writ of certiorari.
123

Id.

124

St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *26.

125

Id. at *25 (paragraph breaks omitted).

126 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 793
(9th Cir. 2015).
127

Id. at 781.

128

Id. The decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals further underscores that
competition remains the primary focus of section 7 enforcement. Even when industry-specific
benefits or improvements are possible or likely, market competition remains paramount:
But even if we assume that the claimed efficiencies were merger-specific, the
defense would nonetheless fail. At most, the district court concluded that St. Luke’s
might provide better service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, but
the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition or create monopolies
simply because the merged entity can improve its operations. The district court did not
clearly err in concluding that whatever else St. Luke’s proved, it did not demonstrate
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II. WHY AN EXEMPTION TO SECTION 7 IS APPROPRIATE
On its face, the district court’s St. Luke’s decision likely appears to be a
straightforward and appropriate result of section 7 enforcement. However, this case
and its surrounding facts do much more than provide a recent example of how the
FTC approaches antitrust enforcement in the health care sector. This case illustrates
the market and regulatory challenges impacting health care.129 Chief Judge Winmill,
in his district court opinion, paraphrases pervading public opinion.130 He underscores
the need for change, experimentation, and innovation when it comes to
organizational models in the health care space.131 But the court’s ultimate decision—
divesture—is inconsistent with current federal health policy initiatives, including the
Affordable Care Act.
The Affordable Care Act is aimed at accomplishing three things: (1) increased
individual access to health insurance and health care services, (2) improved quality
of care provided to individuals, and (3) accomplishing both at an overall lower
cost.132 By reviewing the facts and conclusions reached by the district court and the
Ninth Circuit, the rationale for St. Luke’s acquisition of Saltzer is directly in line
with these overarching goals. Yet the FTC’s enforcement of section 7 prevented the
business relationship between St. Luke’s and Saltzer from coming to fruition and
producing its intended results. This dichotomy presents a significant problem.
Although opinions vary, this type of provider integration has the potential to
deliver real benefits to patients and communities across the United States. Despite
this potential, section 7’s enforcement can prevent mergers and acquisitions intended
to coordinate care delivery, increase efficiency, and drive cost savings if the FTC
“predicts” potential anticompetitive effects. In an effort to balance antitrust
enforcement and the high-level priorities associated with health care reform, strict
enforcement of section 7 should be reevaluated. FTC enforcement should support
government and industry efforts to contain rising health care costs and improve
clinical quality. This can be accomplished by Congress enacting legislation that
allows for a narrow statutory exemption to enforcement of section 7. Such a
statutory exemption would permit transactions similar to St. Luke’s attempted
acquisition of Saltzer, while avoiding substantial degradation of antitrust regulatory
authority and its associated consumer protections.
Given the information presented, strict enforcement of section 7 does not align
with federal and industry efforts to improve health care in terms of cost and quality.
Mergers and acquisitions capable of delivering benefits to patients and the industry
as a whole run the risk of being prevented or unwound unless legislative action is
taken. A statutory exemption to enforcement of section 7 would allow certain
appropriate transactions to occur. However, each transaction should have to meet the
that efficiencies resulting from the merger would have a positive effect on
competition.
Id. at 791-92.
129

See St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25.

130

See id.

131

See id.

132 Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 56 (summarizing the key features
of the Affordable Care Act).
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following criteria: (1) demonstrate likely cost savings or efficiencies, (2) focus on
enhancing quality or patient outcomes, and (3) aim to enhance or maintain existing
health care service offerings (hereinafter “Proposed Exemption Criteria”). Despite
arguments to the contrary, substantial rationale support this approach.
A. Financial Rationale
1. The Health Care Industry’s Current and Past Performance
More than anything, the health care industry’s current and past financial
performance provide the strongest support for exploring alternatives to bend the cost
curve downward. As indicated, health care accounts for a substantial portion of per
capita spending and gross domestic product in the United States.133 That is partially
due to the current fee-for-service business model, where providers are incentivized
to conduct more procedures, as opposed to delivering a specific patient outcome at
the best possible financial value.134 Despite the proliferation of spending, lowered
reimbursement rates have increased financial pressure on health care providers of all
sizes.135 Such decreases are likely necessary for substantial cost savings across the
industry; however, not all providers will be able to remain solvent without the help
of larger, more financially stable organizations. Allowing mergers and acquisitions
that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria could help financially strained health care
providers stabilize and move to more sustainable operating structures and
reimbursement models.136 This could, in turn, drive improvement across the industry.
2. Capital Requirements for Reinvestment in the System
In addition to systemic financial challenges, health care has been and will
continue to be a capital-intensive industry.137 Advancements in health care delivery,
133

See supra discussion Part I.A.2.

134

See supra notes 25-28 and associated text related to fee-for-service payment.

135

See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.

136 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/the-strategy-that-will-fix-health-care.
The authors indicate that a new industry-wide health care strategy should be focused on the
following:

At its core is maximizing value for patients: that is, achieving the best outcomes at
the lowest cost. We must move away from a supply-driven health care system
organized around what physicians do and toward a patient-centered system organized
around what patients need. We must shift the focus from the volume and profitability
of services provided—physician visits, hospitalizations, procedures, and tests—to the
patient outcomes achieved. And we must replace today’s fragmented system, in which
every local provider offers a full range of services, with a system in which services for
particular medical conditions are concentrated in health-delivery organizations and in
the right locations to deliver high-value care.
Id.
137

See Rene Letourneau, Capital Spending Reflects New Era in Healthcare,
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/FIN300783/Capital-Spending-Reflects-New-Era-in-Healthcare
(referencing
infrastructure
enhancements and information technology as two examples of major capital expenditures
among health care providers); John Marcille, A Conversation with Paul H. Keckley, PhD:
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as well as technology, constantly require providers to make significant and frequent
investments in new medical equipment, technology, and infrastructure.138 As
exhibited by the St. Luke’s and Saltzer merger, Saltzer was incapable of investing in
a new electronic health record system without the financial support of a larger
organization.139 Such financial limitations are commonplace, but substantial
investment is necessary for providers to transition to emerging value-based
reimbursement models.140 Exempting mergers and acquisitions that meet the
Proposed Exemption Criteria would give smaller or less financially capable health
care providers greater opportunity to partner with larger organizations to deliver
greater value to patients and communities as a whole.
3. Transition from Volume to Value and the Realignment of Incentives
Arguments for moving from volume- to value-based reimbursement can be found
almost anywhere across the United States, including Chief Judge Winmill’s
conclusion in St. Luke’s.141 To make this kind of transition, access to significant
amounts of capital funding is required,142 as is institutional knowledge, and a
population base that allows for financial risk to be spread appropriately.143 The
volume-to-value transition presents a novel opportunity to align financial incentives
for both payers and providers. Providers will be incentivized to provide quality and
medically necessary care to patients as efficiently as possible. Payers, in turn, will
Clinical Perspective Critical to Health Care Reform, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Feb. 2012),
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1202/1202.qna_keckley.html (referencing the
capital needs among health plans and managed care organizations, which parallels the capital
intensive nature of providers).
138 See, e.g., Beth Kutscher, UPMC Issuing $400 Million in Bonds to Fund Ongoing
HEALTHCARE
(Sept.
15,
2014),
Projects,
MODERN
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140915/NEWS/309159939/upmc-issuing-400million-in-bonds-to-fund-ongoing-projects (indicating the health system’s capital spending
will be focused on outpatient centers and technology upgrades in western Pennsylvania).
139 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *3, *18 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014)
aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
140

See The State of Value-Based Reimbursement and the Transition from Volume to Value
in 2014, MCKESSON (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.mckesson.com/bps/bps-knowledgecenter/the-state-of-value-based-reimbursement-and-the-transition-from-volume-to-value-in2014 (noting several trends that point to the importance of information technology).
141

“Health care is at a crisis point. Nationally, quality lags far behind the
inexorable rise in prices. This has created a groundswell of demand for change. One
change universally recommended is to move away from fee-for-service
reimbursement and toward integrated care and risk-based reimbursement, where
payment is made on the basis of patient outcomes, not the volume of services.” St.
Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25.
142

See supra Part II.A.2.

143

See generally Population Health Solutions: Support for the Journey to Value-based
Care, ADVISORY BD. CO., http://www.advisory.com/solutions/population-health (last visited
Feb. 13, 2015) (detailing the firm’s approach to population health consulting and priorities
providers should consider for success in value-based care delivery).
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compensate those providers based on the value of their services. As a result, the
patient receives better, more cost effective care. This could result in a renewed focus
on patient outcomes that actually benefits all involved parties. Allowing transactions
that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria could advance these efforts by giving
providers greater access to needed resources.
B. Quality Rationale
1. Fragmentation of the Current System and Misalignment of Providers
Part of the reason for the United States’ rising health care costs and mediocre
quality is the fragmented system.144 Care delivery is often conducted in “silos,”
where various caregivers do not communicate effectively or share critical patient
information.145 This can be partially improved through the use of robust technology
systems as well as growing the size of a given provider network to include more
clinicians who are vested in and working for a single entity.146 Granted, classical
mergers and acquisitions are not the only ways to align caregivers of varying
specialties;147 however, given the financial conditions of the health care industry as a
whole, any opportunity for improved alignment and coordination should be
thoroughly explored. Transactions that satisfy the Proposed Exemption Criteria
support greater integration and coordination of care.
2. Improved Health Care Quality as a Consumer Protection
The federal antitrust laws were enacted as a form of consumer protection.148 To
build on that lasting and meaningful principle, exploring new opportunities to afford
Americans better access to and improved quality of health care services are
substantial consumer protection efforts. Further, providing better care at an improved
overall value is another substantial consumer benefit. These ideals align with the
fundamental purposes of health care reform;149 however, the industry disruption
caused by the Affordable Care Act has health care providers desperately trying to
find new ways to improve financial and clinical performance. Even though some
transactions might be considered anticompetitive from a pure section 7 perspective,
transactions that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria could be just as consumeroriented as the ideals encompassed by the antitrust laws themselves.
144

See Alan C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition in Health Care: It Takes Systems
to Pursue Quality and Efficiency, HEALTH AFFS. W5-420 (Sept. 7, 2005).
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/09/07/hlthaff.w5.420.
145

See id. at W5-428.

146

See generally id.

147

See, e.g., ESSENTIAL HOSPS. INST., INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE LITERATURE REVIEW 1-2,
http://essentialhospitals.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Integrated-Health-Care-LiteratureReview-Webpost-8-22-13-CB.pdf (May 2013) (listing various definitions for integrated
delivery systems). In addition, accountable care organizations are often considered a method
for providers to align – but not necessarily merge – in an effort to control health spending and
delivery quality health outcomes. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
148

See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.

149

Recall the overarching principles of health care reform, as indicated supra Part I.A.3.
Likewise, the idea of government-supported consumer protection clearly aligns with the
concept of the Triple Aim. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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C. Access and Innovation Rationale
1. Maintenance of Existing Services
Because of health care’s financial pressures, maintaining existing health care
services and resources will be a challenge for many providers in the future.150 Some
will consolidate or be forced out of practice due to market forces.151 However, in
rural or underserved areas, maintaining existing services is critical to community
health.152 The Proposed Exemption Criteria may prove most beneficial in rural or
underserved health care markets or those with minimal competition. This
underscores the importance of the Proposed Exemption Criteria, especially the
criterion related to the maintenance or enhancement of available health services.
2. The Value of Integration and Government-sponsored Innovation Projects
As briefly noted, the federal government values and promotes integration and
coordination of health care delivery through various programs and projects.153 Some
examples include accountable care organizations and bundled payment initiatives.154
It is these types of programs that are designed to lower costs and drive value in
health care delivery. If successful, they may be used on a broader scale or be
implemented to a greater extent by private payers and organizations.155 Preventing
transactions, like St. Luke’s, stifles organizational innovation and limits the
opportunities for providers to participate and collaborate in government-sponsored
and market-driven reimbursement experiments. Governmental as well as marketdriven efforts are equally imperative for lasting improvement across the industry.

150

See supra notes 35, 44-48 and accompanying text.

151

See generally PHYSICIANS FOUND., HEALTH REFORM AND THE DECLINE OF PHYSICIAN
PRIVATE
PRACTICE
(2010),
http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/uploads/default/Health_Reform_and_the_Decline_of_P
hysician_Private_Practice.pdf; Peter Pavarini & Matt Lindsay, Health Care Reform Going
Forward: What’s the Impact on Providers? BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/health-carereform-going-forward-whats-the-impact-on-providers.html.
152 See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMPROVING RURAL HEALTH:
STATE
POLICY
OPTIONS
(2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/RuralHealth_PolicyOptions_1113.pdf;
Joseph
R.
Betancourt et al., Cultural Competence and Health Care Disparities: Key Perspectives and
AFFAIRS
499
(Mar.
2005),
Trends,
24
HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/24/2/499.short.
153

See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.

154

See supra notes 33-34.

155 See NAT’L COMM. ON QUALITY ASSURANCE, NCQA ACCREDITATION OF ACCOUNTABLE
CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
1-3
(2013),
http://www.ncqa.org/Portals/0/ACO%20Press%20Conference/ACO%20White%20Paper%20
Feb.%202013.pdf (noting how accountable care organizations can demonstrate readiness for
accreditation).
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D. A New Standard for Exemption
As part of the recommended statutory exemption, certain existing antitrust
concepts should be revised. For one, when the FTC’s Bureau of Competition,
administrative law judges, or courts review efficiency defenses, efficiencies
presented by merging entities should no longer be required to be “merger
specific.”156 Given the health care industry’s financial challenges and issues with
fragmentation, any benefits that might result from transactions that meet the
Proposed Exemption Criteria should be viewed favorably because such transactions
would support the overarching goals of bending the cost curve downward and
improving care delivery. Therefore, when merging parties present potential
efficiency defenses, they should be considered without regard to being merger
specific.
In addition, as long as the transaction aligns with the Proposed Exemption
Criteria, the FTC, administrative law judges, and courts should weigh facts and
resolve doubts related to anticompetitive effects in favor of the transaction. This is in
contrast to the current approach where any uncertainties are resolved against the
transaction.157 Similar to the comments made by Chief Judge Winmill in his district
court opinion, favoring transactions that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria
would allow for controlled experiments and innovation in terms of organizational
models.158 The elimination of the “merger specific” requirement for efficiencies and
a new approach to resolving factual uncertainties would allow for only certain types
of transactions to occur without undermining section 7’s larger purpose and
authority.
CONCLUSION
The American health care system is in a prolonged financial crisis. As a country,
the United States is spending more on health care and getting less value and positive
health outcomes. Several policies and efforts are underway in an effort to drive costs
downward and improve clinical quality.159 Some may prove successful, while others
may not. Regardless, it is the responsibility of the federal government and the health
care industry itself to pursue every opportunity to innovate and improve
performance. Further, the federal government must respond to the call for change
and permit industry participants to explore all methods of achieving success.
Allowing the integration of certain health care providers focused on producing cost
savings or efficiencies, enhancing quality and patient outcomes, and enhancing or
maintaining existing health care service offerings is a significant opportunity to
156

See GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 10.

157 See FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (holding
that doubts related to anticompetitive effects are to be resolved against the transaction at
issue).
158 See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *25 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) aff’d,
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). “In a world that was not governed by the Clayton Act, the best
result might be to approve the Acquisition and monitor its outcome to see if the predicted
price increases actually occurred. In other words, the Acquisition could serve as a controlled
experiment.” Id.
159

See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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advance the ideals of meaningful health care reform. Antitrust enforcement in the
health care sector should reflect those ideals. Thus, a statutory exemption to strict
enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act should be considered a viable
opportunity to promote and advance health system transformation for the better, as
long as the merging providers satisfy the Proposed Exemption Criteria.160

160

Health care provider transactions should be exempt from Section 7 enforcement as long
as they meet the following criteria: (1) demonstrate likely cost savings or efficiencies, (2)
focus on enhancing quality or patient outcomes, and (3) aim to enhance or maintain existing
health care service offerings.
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